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Arbitration or Stipulation:
Playing Word Games in the
Federal Courts
DDI Seamless Cylinder Int'l. v. Gen. Fire Extinguisher Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In both its private and more recently, public (court-annexed) forms,
arbitration has proven to be an effective tool in fighting the explosion of litigation.
In certain contexts, however, some dispute has arisen as to who can actually be an
arbitrator.2 DDI Seamless Cylinder provides an excellent example of this newly
disputed area in the framework of the federal courts.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The plaintiff, DDI Seamless Cylinder International Incorporated ("DDI"), is
a manufacturer of metal cylinders used in the making of fire extinguishers.' In
1989, DDI entered into a contract with the defendant, General Fire Extinguisher
Corporation ("General Fire"), to supply it with cylinders for the manufacture of
the extinguishers themselves.4 However, after DDI tooled for production and
started producing the cylinders, General Fire repudiated the contract.' After the
repudiation, DDI brought suit in federal district court for breach of contract
seeking damages of more than $400,000.6 However, due to the district court's
crowded docket, the parties agreed to have the case tried before a federal
magistrate, Judge Bobrick.' Settlement talks ensued and after protracted efforts
to resolve their differences out of court, the parties agreed to appoint Judge
Bobrick to arbitrate the dispute.' Judge Bobrick agreed to act as an arbitrator,
and on April 6, 1992, he issued an order establishing the procedure for settling the

1.

14 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir. 1994).

2.
See, e.g., Kirk Johnson, Public Judges as Private Contractors: A Legal Frontier, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 10, 1993, at D20 (discussing Connecticut's program of authorizing public state court

judges to double as private arbitrators).
3.

DDI Seamless Cylinder Int'l, 14 F.3d at 1163.

4. Id at1164.
5. Id. General Fire claimed that the cylinders were defective and, as Judge Posner points out,
General Fire claimed that "the fire extinguisher market has been on a slide downward and frankly, the
market is no longer here." Id.

6. Id.
7. Id
8. Id
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case.9 An auditor would determine the losses of DDI and if any disputes 0arose
as to these losses, Judge Bobrick, as arbitrator, would decide these issues.'
The auditor's report was submitted to Judge Bobrick in his role as magistrate
judge." After hearings regarding the objections to the auditor's report were held
before Judge Bobrick, the judge issued a document captioned "Judgment," which
stated that the defendant owed the plaintiff $124,860.12 If the defendant failed
to pay the judgment by the specified date, liquidated damages in the amount of
$150 per day were to be levied against the defendant and payable to the plaintiff
for each day the judgment remained unpaid.' 3 General Fire appealed from this
order, apparently 14 claiming that the parties had no power to appoint a magistrate
judge to arbitrate their dispute.'5
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Chief Judge Posner found
that arbitration was not within a federal magistrate's required duties.'6 Thus,
finding that the magistrate could not have acted as an arbitrator, the court stated
that one way to view what the parties and the judge did in this case is that both
parties agreed to a stipulated, non-appealable procedure. 7 Therefore, the court
held that this was not an arbitration per se, but rather an agreed upon informal
procedure that had the misnomer of "arbitration."' 8 When viewed as an informal
procedure, the court found the procedure was not improper, merely mislabeled,
and affirmed the magistrate's resolution.' 9 In so finding, the court held that
although these parties were bound to their agreement utilizing an alternative
procedure to resolve their dispute, when two litigants agree to arbitrate their

9. Id
10. Id. The procedure agreed upon first required Judge Bobrick to decide the damages issues
upon conclusion of the audit; next, the final determination of the actual losses was to be reported to
the court. Then the parties were to enter a stipulation and order for payment of the losses. Following
such payment, the parties were to enter a stipulation to dismiss the lawsuit with prejudice and without
legal costs and fees. Id. at 1164-65.
11. Id.at 1165. The auditor's report found that DDI had sustained a net loss of $38,000. Id.
12. Id.In its entirety, the "Judgment" stated that "Defendant shall pay the sum of $124,860 to
the Plaintiff and its attorney within 10 days from the date of this Order. In the event of the failure of
the Defendant to pay this amount within the time provided, Plaintiff shall have liquidated damages in
the amount of one hundred and fifty ($150.00) per day each day the payment [sic) remains unpaid."
Id.
13. Id.
14. Even after close questioning at oral argument, the Court of Appeals was uncertain exactly
what relief defendant sought. Id "
15.
Id. Further, the defendant claimed that the "Judgment" issued by the magistrate should,
therefore, be treated as if it were an ordinary civil judgment rather than an arbitrator's award.
Consequently, this judgment should be reversed because the magistrate's findings of fact with regard

to DDI's damages were clearly erroneous, or alternatively because General Fire had a right to an
evidentiary hearing. DDI argued that the appeal was frivolous because both parties waived their right
to appeal. Id.
16. Id (citing 28 U.S.C § 636 (1988)).
17. Id at 1166.
18.
19.

Id.
Id.
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dispute, it is not within the judicial power of a federal judge or magistrate to act
as an arbitrator for that dispute.2'
I.

LEGAL HISTORY

A. ADR andArbitration in the Federal Courts
Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") were adopted a halfcentury ago, the caseload of the federal court system has increased dramatically. 2
The number of cases filed in federal courts grew from 33,591 in 1938 to 217,879
in 1990.22 Due to this explosion of litigation, the development of alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR") has received added attention." Over the last few
years, federal district judges have utilized ADR to address this problem. 24 Some
of the ADR methods employed by the district courts have included court-annexed
arbitration, summary jury trials,26 mediation27 and early-neutral evaluation. 2 '
Moreover, the availability of private dispute resolution providers, ranging from
mediators to rent-a-judge programs,29 where the parties bypass the court system
altogether, has also helped reduce the federal court caseload."
Arbitration in particular has helped to alleviate the expanding federal case
docket.3 Arbitration is a private means of dispute resolution that uses neutral
third parties to review particular disputed claims and render binding decisions. 2
Arbitration has been used in England and the United States for centuries. 3 In

20. Id.
21. Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the FederalCourts, 76 IOWA
L. REV. 889 (1991).
22. l
23.
(1987),

See LEONARD L. RIsKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DisPUTE RESOLUTION and LAWYERS I

24. Dayton, supra note 21, at 891.
25. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988).
26. See Dayton, supra note 21, at 891 n.13. A total of 13 federal district courts have local rules
or standing orders permitting summary jury trials in certain cases. Id.
27. At least five federal district courts have local rules permitting mandatory mediation. Id
28. Id at 912,
29. However, in private ADR, such as rent-a-judge programs, there is a concern that private
dispute resolution providers are wooing away public judges with the lure of higher salaries that the
public sector cannot offer. This has been seen by some as counterproductive to the judicial system.
See Johnson, supra note 2, at D20; see, e.g., Exploring the Issues in PrivateJudging, JUDICATURE,
JariiFeb. 1994, at 203 (discussing various issues regarding private judging).
30. Lisa Bernstein, Understandingthe Limits of Court-ConnectedADR: A CritiqueofFederal
Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA, L. REV. 2169 (1993).
31. Arbitration in both its private and public (court-annexed) forms has helped in this respect.
Cf Dayton, supra note 21, at 76.
32. G. Richard Shell, Res Judicata and CollateralEstoppel Effects of CommercialArbitration,
35 U.C.LA. L. REV. 623 (1988).
33. RisKiN & WESTBROOK, supranote 23, at 121 (citing Mentschikoff, CommercialArbitration,
61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-855 (1961)).
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1925 Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act, more commonly known
as the Uniform Arbitration Act, and today almost every state has enacted some
form of arbitration legislation. 4 The Supreme Court has also given its approval
to arbitration by repeatedly enforcing agreements to arbitrate, even in cases
involving anti-trust or other statutory claims." Arbitration has enjoyed wide
acceptance in a number of contexts; most notably, in the resolution of
construction, insurance, and labor-management disputes. 6
Arbitration possesses characteristics that differ from traditional adjudication
in many respects." The most notable advantage of arbitration, as compared to
adjudication, is the rapid, relatively inexpensive, and efficient resolution of a
dispute. Other purported benefits of arbitration are that it: provides a private
forum that avoids unwelcome publicity, preserves the good will between the

parties, allows the use of an arbitrator with specialized expertise in the subject
matter of the dispute,39 and gives the parties freedom from being bound by
established legal rules of law in resolving the dispute.40 Moreover, unless
otherwise agreed upon, arbitration is normally not appealable. 4' Additionally, in
many instances, traditional adjudication can be altered to resemble the more
abbreviated arbitration-type procedure if the parties agree to certain stipulated
procedures.42
As mentioned above, publicly-provided, court-annexed arbitration has been
used in recent years as an alternative to private arbitration in order to relieve

34.
John V. O'Hara, The New Jersey Alternative Procedure for Dispute Resolution Act:
Vanguard of a "Better Way'"? 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1728 (1988) (noting that every state except
Vermont has adopted arbitration legislation closely resembling the Uniform Arbitration Act).
35. Id. at 1728 (citing Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483
(1987); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985)).
36. RisKIN & WESTBRooK, supra note 23, at 122. In 1985 alone, 3735 cases involving claims
totaling $646 million were filed in the construction industry. Id.
37. See, e.g., RIsKiN & WESTBROOK, supra note 23, 120-55 (noting general procedural aspects
of arbitration). However, this section of the Note will not concentrate on the specific procedural
differences between arbitration and adjudication.
38. See O'Hara, supra note 34, at 1731.
39. Id, at 1740. Although this has been noted as a benefit of arbitration, the use of an expert
may also prove detrimental. Arbitrators that are familiar with an industry's practice may also have
"deeply ingrained beliefs and prejudices," thus perhaps losing the benefit of impartiality. Also, if a
non-expert is used, they might bring a fresh approach to a problem. Id.
40. Id.
41. DDI Seamless Cylinder Int'l, 14 F.3d at 1166.
42. The parties can agree to various stipulated procedures in order to expedite the resolution of
their dispute. See, e.g,. Brotherhood Shipping Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 985 F.2d 323,
327 (7th Cir. 1993) (parties agreeing to waive right to present oral testimony and instead treat the
summary judgment proceeding as the trial on the merits); Planned Parenthood Ass'nlChicago Area v.
Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1228 n.3 (7th Cir. 1985) (parties agreeing that the hearing on
preliminary injunction shall be deemed the trial on the merits as well); United Auto Workers v. Randall
Div. of Textron Inc., 5 F.3d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1993); Peterson v. Lindner, 765 F.2d 698, 700 (7th Cir.
1985) (parties agreeing to trial on stipulated facts).
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federal judicial caseloads. 43 It is by far the most widespread form of mandatory
ADR used in the federal courts. 44 As with normal, private arbitration, "[t]he
aims of court-annexed arbitration are to reduce the cost of litigation, to facilitate
speedy disposition of claims, and to reduce the overall number of cases going to
trial. ' , 45 Using these criteria, court-annexed arbitration has generally been
successful in its goals.46
Even though federal court-annexed arbitration is mandatory, there are
inherent differences between public and private ADR in addition to the abovestated attributes of court-annexed arbitration that purport to justify its existence.47
There are barriers to the voluntary use of private ADR that are not present with
public court-annexed arbitration. 48 These include a party's hesitancy or
apprehension to suggest ADR because doing so may suggest that their case is
weak; this is otherwise known as "signaling. '49' Furthermore, the asymmetric
ability of the parties to bear the costs of delay is another barrier."0 In other
words, "[o]ne of the primary reasons that parties might not enter into an ADR
agreement even when it can produce private benefits is that the delay associated
with trial is frequently advantageous to one side. . . ."' Another barrier to
voluntary ADR are the lawyer-client conflicts of interest that can develop in
respect to fees. 2 Because of these barriers to private ADR" and the inherent
advantages of arbitration, 4 publicly provided ADR such as court-annexed
arbitration is said to be not only a justifiable but a preferable alternative.5"

43. See Bernstein, supra note 30. In 1978, Congress authorized the creation of the first three
federal district court-annexed arbitration programs. Id. The programs required parties to participate
in a mandatory court-annexed arbitration hearing as a precondition to obtaining a trial. Id Litigants
unhappy with the arbitration result could ask for trial de novo subject to certain penalties in some
districts. Id.; See, e.g., A. Leo Levin & Deirdre Golash, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Federal

District Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29 (1985).
44. See Dayton, supra note 21, at 89. At least ten federal district cours now have some form
ofmandatory court-annexed arbitration on a consistent basis. Id Most districts' programs are modeled
after either the Eastern District of Pennsylvania or the Northern District of California which are the
two oldest arbitration programs currently operating in the federal courts. Id. at 900. For procedural
details regarding the programs see Id. at 900-04 and Bernstein, supra note 30, at 2177-186.
45. Dayton, supra note 21.
46. See, Levin & Golash, supra note 43, at 33-36; Dayton, supra note 21, at 904.
47. See, Bernstein, supra note 30.
48. Bernstein, supra note 30, at 2189-97.
49. Id. at 2191-93.
50. Id.at 2191-94.
51. Id. Moreover, the party who is better able to bear the cost of delay is usually unwilling to
give up this strategic advantage. Id.
52. Id. at 2195. "A lawyer paid on an hourly basis has a strong incentive to encourage his client
to request a trial since most legal fees are earned during discovery and trial." Id.
53. Id. at 2196. Another argument for court mandated ADR is the nature of tort claims. In the
tort context, the parties rarely have the opportunity to bargain before the dispute arises, and, therefore,
delay almost always favors the defendant. Id.
54. See, Bernstein, supra note 30.
55. Id.
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As previously mentioned, federal district judges have implemented ADR
programs to help reduce their caseload." The authority by which federal district
judges effect the various ADR procedures typically comes through local rules
promulgated by the district where the judge sits." The authority for these local
rules arises from FRCP Rule 16 or Rule 83 or under the doctrine of "inherent
judicial authority."58
Prior to amendment in 1993, Rule 16(c)(7), in particular, invited the parties
to a lawsuit to consider "the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the
dispute."59 Advocates of ADR in federal courts contend that pre-amended Rule
0
16 authorizes federal district courts to implement mandatory ADR procedures."
There is also case law to that effect." However, some critics, including Judge
Richard Posner,' 2 posit that Rule 16 gives no authority to implement such ADR
procedures.' 3

56. See, e.g., supra notes 25-28.
57. Dayton, supra note 21, at 932.
58. Id "Inherent judicial authority" seems to have no set definition. However, it implies the
inherent power of the court to exercise their discretion in regulating the practice of law in their court.
59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (1983) provides that "[tihe participants at any [pretrial] conference
under this rule may consider and take action with respect to the possibility of settlement or the use of
extrajudicialprocedures to resolve the dispute." (Emphasis added).
60. See Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 andAlternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
818 (1988) (stating that Rule 16 was amended in 1983 with the unmistakable purpose of encouraging
ADR as a significant part of the judicial process).
61. See, e.g., Home Owner Funding Corp. ofAmerica v. Century Bank, 695 F.Supp. 1343, 1347
n-3 (D. Mass. 1988) (indicating the court has the authority to order a summary jury trial under Rule
16); Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. 603 (D. Minn. 1988) (court
has authority to compel participation in summary jury proceedings); Arabian American Oil Co. v.
Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (citing Rule 16 as basis for compelling participation in
summary jury trial); Cincinnati Gas*& Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 117 F.R.D. 597, 599 (S.D. Ohio
1987) (indicating Rule 16 gives the court authority to conduct summary jury trials) (citing Dayton,
supra note 20, at 932, n.188).
62. See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial andOther Methods of Alternative Dipute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 366 (1986). Judge Posner states:
I can also find nothing in rule 16 (pretrial conference) to suggest that judges are
authorized to convene juries to assist in settlement. It is true that rule 16(c)(7) permits
the participants in the pretrial conference to "consider and take action with respect to..
. the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute."
But the Advisory Committee's note to the 1983 amendment which added this subsection
does not mention summary jury trial or authorize any special procedure for encouraging
settlement.
Id at 385. However, Posner later concedes that "[o]f course not everything not expressly authorized
by the federal rules is therefore forbidden to federal judges." Id at 386.
63. See, e.g., Note, Limits of Judicial Authority in PretrialSettlement Under Rule 16 of the
FederalRules-of Civil Procedure,2 OIHO ST. J. on Disp. RESOL. 311, 330 (1987); Dayton, supra note
21, at 932-37.
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Most ADR procedures are authorized and implemented through local rules
in accordance with Rule 8364 of the FRCP. 61 Rule 83 permits federal district
courts to promulgate local rules governing their practice as long as these rules are
not inconsistent with other rules of the FRCP. 6 Because Rule 83 states that the
local rules must merely be consistent with the other federal rules, Rule 83 gives

the federal district courts broad discretion to fashion 67local rules and promulgate

orders to implement ADR procedures as they see fit.
In a few districts, ADR procedures are imposed on parties by court order. 8
This practice is usually justified under Rule 83 or under the doctrine of "inherent
judicial authority". 69 While these orders are not subject to the rule-making
procedures of Rule 83, they must be70 consistent with both the Federal Rules and
the local rules of that district court.

B. FederalMagistrateJudges
"Given the bloated dockets that district courts have now come to expect as
ordinary, the role of the magistrate in today's federal judicial system is nothing
less than indispensable.",7 ' Although others do not share the same zeal regarding
the proper function of federal magistrate judges, 2 it is conceded that magistrate
judges have indeed lessened the workload of federal district judges.7 ' Federal
magistrate judges were first introduced into the federal court system following
enactment of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968. 74 Magistrates were instituted
to meet the demands of an overwhelmed federal docket, however, district courts
have utilized magistrates in less traditional capacities.7 ' For example, magistrates

64. Fed. R.Civ. P. 83 provides in pertinent part: "Each district court by action of a majority of
the judges thereof may from time to time, after giving appropriate public notice and an opportunity
to comment, make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules."
65. See Dayton, supra note 21, at 937.
66. See supra note 65.
67. See Dayton, supra note 21, at 937.
68. Id. at 944.
69. See supra note 59; see also, e.g., McKay v. Ashland Oil Co., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky.
1988) ("mandatory summary jury trials would seem to be within the inherent power of the court");
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis v. Carey-Canada, 123 F.R.D. 603, 604 (D. Minn. 1988) ("the
court possesses the authority to compel participation and attendance in a summary jury trial").
70. See Dayton, supra note 21, at 944.
71. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 949 (1990).
72. Most of the controversy regarding the proper role of magistrates is their expanding judicial
power with regard to Article III of the Constitution. See, e.g., Raymond P. Bolanos, Note, Magistrates
and Felony Voir Dire: A Threat to Fundamental Fairness?, 40 HASTINGs L.J. 827 (1989); Brendan
L. Shannon, Note, The Federal Magistrates Act: A New Article III Analysis for a New Breed of
Judicial Officer, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 253 (1991).
73. Cf Richard A. Posner, Coping with the Caseload A Comment on Magistrates and Masters,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 2215, 2216 (1989); Bolanos, supra note 72, at n.48.
74. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1988).
75. See Bolanos, supra note 72, at 839.
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now exercise many of the same powers as federal district judges, such as: deciding
motions, hearing evidence, instructing juries, and rendering decisions in certain
civil and criminal cases.76 It should be noted that any judgments entered by a
magistrate are appealable to the applicable court of appeals."
The empowerment of federal magistrate judges comes from federal statute. 78
The duties of magistrates are also found in federal statute.7 9 Congress has
While acting in their
authorized both full-time and part-time magistrates.'
judicial capacities, full-time magistrates "may not engage in the practice of law,
and may not engage in any other business, occupation, or employment inconsistent
with the expeditious, proper, and impartial performance of their duties as judicial
officers." 8 Moreover, "[a] magistrate may be assigned such additional duties as
are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States. ' 82 In
summary, because of the increasing federal caseload, federal magistrate judges
perform an essential function in the courts that is considered indispensable in
modem federal jurisprudence. 3
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
In DDI Seamless Cylinder,8 4 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed
(1)whether a federal magistrate judge could be an arbitrator; (2) whether the
"arbitration" consented to by the parties could alternatively be described as a
stipulated procedure; and (3) whether liquidated damages could be imposed on
General Fire in the event of default on the judgment. 5 Chief Judge Richard
Posner, writing for the three-judge panel, first noted that General Fire was correct
in stating that arbitration is not in the job description of a federal judge, including
a magistrate judge. 6 Further, the court stated that federal statutes authorizing
arbitration do not "appear" to authorize the appointment of judges or magistrates
as arbitrators. 7 Moreover, it was noted that when parties consent to proceed
before a magistrate judge, the magistrate is authorized only to "order the entry of
judgement in the case" and not to make an arbitration award. 8 The court stated

76. See Shannon, supra note 72, at 253.
77. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (1988).
78. See supra note 74.
79. 28 U.S.C §§ 632, 636 (1988).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 632 (1988).
81. 28 U.S.C § 632(a) (1988). Different rules of conduct apply to part-time federal magistrate
judges. 28 U.S.C § 632(b) (1988).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1988).
83. See, e.g., supra note 73.
84. 14 F.3d 1163 (7th Cir. 1994)
85. Id at 1165-68.
86. Id.at 1165.
87. Id.
88. Id.(citing 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1988)).
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that an arbitration award must be confirmed by the district court to be
enforceable. 89 Therefore, judges acting as arbitrators could present the novel
scenario where one judge issues an arbitration award and the winner presents that
award to another judge for an order of confirmation.' The court envisioned an
even more curious procedure where, on day one, a magistrate would, while
wearing his judges's hat, encourage the parties to submit their dispute to
arbitration; on day two, while wearing his arbitrator's hat, the magistrate would
arbitrate the parties' dispute; and on day three, while wearing his judge's hat once
more, the magistrate would finally confirm the arbitration award.9
In finding that the procedure used in the lower court was not an arbitration,
the court stated there was an alternative characterization of the procedure the
magistrate judge and the parties employed in the instant case.92 It was that the
parties stipulated to an abbreviated, informal procedure which falls within a
magistrate's inherent judicial capacity.93 Further, the court noted that one way
to describe the fiamework of the underlying decision is that the parties agreed:
(1) that the judge would make a decision on the record consisting of an auditor's
report plus the parties' objections from oral argument, and (2) that they would not
appeal the magistrate's decision. 4 The court noted the parties could have also
agreed to binding arbitration, albeit before an arbitrator rather than a judge.95 It
was then indicated that the magistrate did indeed have authority to decide the so
characterized stipulated procedure which was merely mislabeled as arbitration.96
Judge Posner noted that one of the significant differences between arbitration
and adjudication is that unless the parties provide otherwise, an arbitrator's award
is generally not appealable,97 but is subject only to limited judicial review.98
The court went on to state that because the parties agreed not to appeal the
magistrate's decision, General Fire was without recourse except for the

89.

Id.

90.

Id. Although Judge Posner conceded this was an ingenious idea and since ADR was "all

the rage these days - since at least one state (Connecticut) already authorizes its judges to moonlight
as arbitrators .... the day may not be distant when federal judges will be recommissioned (or issued
supplementary commissions) as arbitrators. But it has not arrived." Id
91. Id. at 1165-66. Further, the court noted an order emanating from such a procedure would
be void as if a "judge issued an order directing President Clinton to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca"; thus
having no legal effect. Id. at 1166.
92. Id. at 1166.
93. Id. The court noted that stipulated procedures had been used by parties before in the Circuit.
See, e.g., supra, note 42.
94. DDI Seamless Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1166.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Under the federal arbitration code, a party can seek to vacate an award by showing that
it is based on fraud, arbitrator's conflict of interest, the arbitrator exceeded the terms of his reference,
or that his award is too indefinite to enforce. Id (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1947)); Barbier v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 120 (2nd Cir. 1991).
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determination of the magistrate judge's authority which the court had previously
decided."
Next, the court commented on the liquidated damages provision of the
magistrate's order which established that General Fire was to pay $150 for each
day the judgment was late in payment."°° The opinion noted it was unusual to
have such a provision in a final order since a plaintiff who obtains a judgment is
already entitled to post-judgment interest by way of statute.t "' Regardless, the
court found that General Fire had forfeited any challenge to the magistrate's
authority regarding the liquidated damages because the issue was not properly
briefed on appeal." 2
Finally, the court stated that although it preferred the alternative
characterization of the magistrate's order as a stipulated procedure instead of an
arbitration, it would not pretend that its characterization was the actual intent of
the parties.' °3 The court stated that perhaps the parties and the magistrate really
did intend for him to step out of his judicial role and become an arbitrator."
However, the court stated, "[o]n balance we think it slightly more plausible to
suppose that the parties and the magistrate judge were agreeing to an abbreviated
10 5
judicial procedure rather than an unauthorized arbitral one. But only slightly."'
In conclusion, the court noted that the judgment was affirmed and that "General
Fire had better hurry up and pay [the judgement] because it's growing by $150
every day .... ,6
V. COMMENT
A. The Instant Case
The court in DDI Seamless Cylinder was correct in its holding that the
judgment should be affirmed. However, the court's reasoning was faulty. The
court should have held that the parties were free to stipulate to an arbitration in
its traditional sense and that the federal magistrate judge was free to arbitrate their
dispute as such.
In finding the magistrate had no power to arbitrate, Judge Posner stated that
arbitration was not in the job description of a federal judge or magistrate. 7

99. DDI Seamless Cylinder, 14 F.3d at 1167.
100. Id Because the liquidated damages issue is not pertinent to the main thrust of this Note,
limited discussion is warranted.
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1961 provides that a party is entitled to the current T-bill rate (currently about
3 percent per annum). Id. Further, the liquidated damages provision imposed a penalty of 43.8
percent per annum. Id
102. Id.at 1168.
103. Id.

104.

Id.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.at 1165.
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Further, he noted that federal statutes authorizing arbitration do not "appear" to
authorize the appointment of federal judges or magistrates as arbitrators."'s
Judge Posner also stated that "it is suggestive that when the consent of the parties
to proceed before a magistrate judge is required he is authorized to 'order the
entry of judgement in the case"0 9 -- not to make an arbitration award."" 0 As
discussed below, these points are faulty at best in attempting to disqualify the
magistrate's authority to arbitrate the case in that the court is construeing these
statutes in an overly restrictive manner.
Merely because arbitration is not within a federal magistrate's job description
does not necessarily prohibit a magistrate from arbitrating a dispute. The same
argument holds true regarding the federal arbitration statutes not "appearing," as
stated by the court, to authorize magistrates to arbitrate disputes."' The court
negatively inferred from the statutes, underlying a magistrate's duties, that unless
stated magistrates can not act as arbitrators. More simply put, the court inferred
that if the statutes do not specifically state you are able to arbitrate the dispute
then you shall not be able to do so. This negative inferential reading does not
make sense in light of the fact that Congress has authorized the use of both
arbitration and magistrates to alleviate the burden of federal judges and their
dockets." 2 This reading of the statutes seems unduly restrictive, unfounded and
of little merit. Moreover, the court's reading of the statute is that a magistrate
judge is authorized only to order entry of a judgment, and not an arbitration
award; this does not necessarily prohibit the magistrate from issuing such an
award. Once again, this appears to be a negative inferential reading of the
applicable statute which seems counter to true Congressional intent."'
To justify the procedure below, Judge Posner stated it was a stipulated
procedure and not an arbitration." 4 Here, it seems the court was involved in a
game of semantics. The court circumvented the arbitration issue by describing
what the parties agreed to as a stipulated procedure. The court's purported
descriptions of the procedural framework in the instant case was a matter of form
over substance. The parties agreed to an arbitration with the magistrate as an
arbitrator; the parties did not agree to a "stipulated procedure" as described by the
court. The court's actions in the instant case are analogous to a court rewriting
a contract for two parties. It also appears odd that the court endorsed a stipulated
procedure but rejected the very same format under the alternative label of
arbitration.
The court should have held that regardless of the proceeding's label, the
parties stipulated to the procedure as an arbitration per se and not some different

og.

Id.

109.
110.
111.
112.

See supra, note 88.
DDI Seamless Cylinder Int'l, 14 F.3d at 1165 (citing 28 U.S.C. 636(c)(1)(1988)).
9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et. seq. (1947) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 651 et. seq. (1947).
See, e.g., supra, notes 26, 31, 32, 75-77.

113.
114.

It seems the court is trying to draw legislative intent from the text of the statute.
DDI Seamless Cylinder Int'l., 14 F.3d at 1166.
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procedure as the court described. Both parties agreed to the procedural framework
that was to be utilized and exactly how the magistrate was to decide the case."'
Further, it should be noted that similar parties have previously utilized various
stipulated procedures in the Seventh Circuit." 6 Due to these considerations, the
court should have let the instant parties call the proceeding whatever they wanted-even arbitration because that word by itself does not possess any independent legal
A possible explanation of the court's decision is Judge Posner's
significance.'
predisposed hostility towards ADR in general."'
Moreover, if the court wanted to take a hard-line stance regarding the
procedure used, it should not have allowed the decision to stand. It should have
then held that the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute and should not have
created a different animal under the auspices of adjudication. However, it is
obvious the court was indeed aware of the equities involved because of its
endorsement of the so-called stipulated procedure and the fact that the parties
agreed not to appeal the magistrate's decision. Regardless, if the court was to take
such a narrow view, it should not have let equity undercut its conservative
interpretation of the law. The court would have accepted the procedure had it
been stipulated to as non-arbitral, but it rejected the same framework because it
was called arbitration. Therefore, since the court adopted the stipulated procedure
which was in substance an arbitration, this would lead one to ask the question:
what is the difference? Answer: there is none.
B. Court-ProvidedArbitration
The instant case provides a basic framework for a possible new type of
federal court-connected alternative dispute resolution. In what this Note has
defined "court-provided arbitration," the federal court, not private parties, would
provide an arbitration forum by which parties could resolve disputes.'
Authority for this type of ADR procedure exists pursuant to Rule 83"2' or
Rule 1621 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As discussed earlier, both
of these rules have allowed federal courts to implement court-connected ADR
programs in the past. 2 However, as proposed, because this procedure would

115.

Id. at 1164.

116.

See supra, note 42.

117. In other words, merely labeling a proceeding "arbitration" does not connote a strict legal
procedure where deviation is forbidden.
118. See supra, note 62 (suggesting J. Posner is hostile to ADR procedures).
119. Although this Note will not delve into the specific details regarding the exact procedure of
such a program, it will attempt to set forth a general framework in how it might operate and its
accompanying attributes. Moreover, such an ADR program could be mandatory much like some courtannexed arbitration. However, for this note's purposes, it will be assumed to be voluntary.
120.
121.

See supra, note 64.
See supra, note 59.

122.

See supra, notes 60-61, 65.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1994/iss2/5

12

1994]

Davis: Davis: Arbitration or Stipulation:
Arbitration or Stipulation

be voluntary, the chances that a party would challenge the decision on grounds of
authority would likely be reduced.
This procedure would operate much like ordinary arbitration except for the
fact that a magistrate," and not a third party, would act as arbitrator. The
parties could elect to opt-in to such a program as soon as the pleadings have been

filed or at the pre-trial conference. The pre-trial conference would seem more
plausible as judges might attempt to persuade likely case candidates to pursue such
an avenue. After the case had been assigned to the program, the parties would

then brief the issues and later present oral arguments to the magistrate.
Subsequent to argument the magistrate would render a non-appealable decision,

similar to private arbitration.'24
There are many attributes of implementing such a publicly-provided
arbitration program. With court-provided arbitration, most of arbitration's inherent
benefits would be present. Most notably, the rapid, relatively inexpensive and
efficient resolution of the dispute would be attained. Litigation often times is
protracted and expensive, and would be avoided. On the other hand, a potential
disadvantage could be that a magistrate would be the arbitrator and not a specialist
in a particular field. Although this might be considered a shortcoming to this
proposal, it has been said that using an expert may sometimes prove detrimental
in arbitration.' 25 Among other disadvantages noted is that the arbitrator might
have deeply ingrained beliefs and prejudices regarding some industry practices that
would not be present with a non-expert. 26 Further, by utilizing an experienced
decision-maker such as a magistrate, it is possible that final decisions would be
better reasoned than those rendered by an expert in the parties' particular field
who is not experienced in dispute resolution.
In addition, because this type of arbitration is directly connected to the court,
2
the aforementioned deficiencies associated with private ADR would be absent. '
Specifically, there would be no "signalling" to the other party regarding the
supposed weakness of one's case. Also, the lawyer-client conflicts of interest
regarding fees would be minimized. Further, the chances that a party will attempt
to delay the resolution of their dispute simply because they are able to bear the
accompanying costs would be greatly reduced due to the voluntary nature of courtprovided arbitration.
Another possible benefit of this program would be the retention of qualified
decision makers in the public sector. Because private arbitration has taken some
judges into the private sector,"' offering a publicly-provided alternative with the
same benefits as private arbitration may reduce the demand for such private

123.

A magistrate, instead of a federal district judge, would be preferable because of the

aforemeMioned heavy caseloads of federal distnet jud gs.
124. The decision of the arbitrator/magistrate could be appealable in the same instances as an
arbitrator's decision is subject to limited judicial review. See 9 U.S.C § 10(a) (1947).
125. See supra,note 39.
126. Id.
127. See supra,notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
128. See supra, note 29.
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arbitration. Thus, there would be less demand for judges in the private sector,
preserving them for the public sector.
An additional benefit of court-provided arbitration would be an added air of
legitimacy to its results. By having a federal magistrate, empowered by Congress,
resolve issues instead of using a third party picked by the parties to arbitrate the
dispute, this will aid the legitimacy of the final results of such a program. These
decisions would be contrasted with the sometimes capricious ones that parties may
feel are handed down by private arbitrators.
Because the federal judges or magistrates could have a hand in funnelling
cases towards court-provided arbitration, certain types of cases could be
encouraged to be resolved through this process. Common tort and contract-related
suits based on similar facts, such as the instant case, would be better suited for
resolution in this type of program due to their frequent results. On the other hand,
cases having potential public policy or Constitutional implications could be
encouraged to stay within the traditional adjudication process. This would have
the effect of keeping public law out of the hands of private parties. 29 In
addition, by taking more private disputes off the docket, like any ADR program,
this would give indigent litigants better access to the courts. 3 By the same
token, indigent litigants utilizing this program would be provided an inexpensive
method to resolve disputes as contrasted with traditional, often expensive,
adjudication. In summary:
[w]hile arbitration . . . may be initiated and completed outside the

judicial framework, some of the most promising devices, such as courtannexed arbitration, [the] summary jury trial, and the various processes
of judge-assisted settlement, are all ADR processes within the judicial
system. The issue thus is not competition between courts and ADR, but
rather what
process of dispute resolution is best for each individual
3
dispute.' '
The ADR program submitted above tries to do just that: channel specific disputes
so as to offer the best resolution for that particular case. It is also offered for the
purpose of proposing yet another form of court-connected alternative dispute
resolution that may ease the burden of the federal dockets. Although this program
as set forth above is not fully developed, it has merit, is a valid proposal, and is
worthy of further inquiry.

129.

See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: PanaceaorAnathema?, 99 HARV.

L. REV. 668 (1986).
130.
131.

Id at 674.
See McKay, supra, note 60 at 822.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although the case was ultimately decided correctly, the court's reasoning is
faulty and its analysis is less than convincing. The court seems to be playing a
game of semantics that suggests form over substance. Regardless, the case helps
lay a basic framework for a proposed type of court-connected arbitration. This
type of ADR program or some variance thereof, may prove to b a viable option
to future parties in resolving their disputes.
JEFFREY T. DAVIS
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